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Gordon: Suggestive Pretrial Identification

IS NEW YORK ACHIEVING MORE RELIABLE AND JUST
CONVICTIONS WHEN THE ADMISSIBILITY OF A
SUGGESTIVE PRETRIAL IDENTIFICATION IS AT ISSUE?
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK
People v. Delamota1
(decided November 17, 2011)
I.

INTRODUCTION

In People v. Delamota, the New York Court of Appeals held a
pretrial photo array was unduly suggestive and therefore in violation
of the defendant’s due process rights.2 The court held that the photo
array was suggestive because the civilian interpreter used during the
identification knew the defendant prior to the pretrial photo array and
influenced the victim’s identification.3 The civilian interpreter used
was the victim’s son, and it only became clear that the victim’s son
knew the defendant during his testimony at trial.4 The court granted a
new trial because it found that the suggestiveness of the identification
procedure was the result of the detective’s decision to use the victim’s son as the interpreter.5 The court also held that, before the new
trial, the People may attempt to show that the victim had an independent source for his in-court identification;6 this would allow for a
valid conviction of the defendant even withstanding the suppression
of the suggestive pretrial identification.7
This Note will address the federal and New York State approaches to the issue of suggestive pretrial photo identifications, and
analyze which approach results in more reliable and just convictions.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

960 N.E.2d 383 (N.Y. 2011).
Id. at 391.
Id.
Id. at 386.
Id. at 391.
Delamota, 960 N.E.2d at 391.
Id.
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For the most part, New York State has followed federal precedent on
this issue except for a minor deviation by the New York Court of
Appeals which may make convictions more just.8 Under the New
York approach, if an identification procedure is deemed suggestive,
then the pretrial identification is not admissible at trial.9 This is the
deviation from federal precedent that is argued to create a more just
result.10 The federal approach allows for both the admission of the
pretrial identification—and subsequent in-court identifications—after
a reliability inquiry to determine whether the witness’ identification
was influenced by the alleged suggestive procedure employed by law
enforcement.11 Although the New York approach allows for subsequent in-court identifications by a witness if the witness has a basis
for the identification independent of the suggestive procedure,12 this
relatively low standard makes the deviation from the federal approach insignificant and possibly more detrimental to the pursuit of
just convictions.13
II.

THE OPINION

This case involved a late night robbery that occurred in October of 2006.14 The victim, Juan Hernandez, was robbed at knifepoint
in an elevator in his apartment building.15 The victim’s son, Juan Jr.,
placed the 911 call shortly after the robbery because his father did not
8

Compare Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977) (holding that evidence derived
from a suggestive pretrial identification is admissible at trial when the identification is found
to be reliable under the totality of the circumstances), with People v. Adams, 423 N.E.2d
379, 383-84 (N.Y. 1981) (holding that the Due Process Clause of the New York State constitution requires a per se rule of exclusion that renders any pretrial identification evidence derived from that suggestive procedure inadmissible at trial).
9
Id. at 383-84.
10
See Adams, 423 N.E.2d at 383-84 (“Permitting the prosecutor to introduce evidence of a
suggestive pretrial identification can only increase the risks of convicting the innocent in
cases where it has the desired effect of contributing to a conviction.”).
11
See Manson, 432 U.S. at 114 (“[R]eliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony.”).
12
People v. Chipp, 552 N.E.2d 608, 613 (N.Y. 1990).
13
See People v. Young, 850 N.E.2d 623, 625 (N.Y. 2006) (holding that the witness had a
basis independent from the suggestive pretrial identification procedure when the witness testified that although the perpetrator wore a mask during the crime, she retained a mental image of the defendant’s eyes).
14
Delamota, 960 N.E.2d at 385.
15
Id.
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speak English.16 When Detective Koch arrived later that night to interview Hernandez, Juan Jr. was used as an interpreter.17
Hernandez described the perpetrator to Detective Koch with
the aid of his son.18 Detective Koch then assembled several photographs of individuals who matched the description of the perpetrator
and showed them to Hernandez.19 Hernandez did not identify any of
the individuals in the photographs as his attacker, and the defendant
was not one of the individuals portrayed.20 After the robbery, Hernandez told his therapist that he recognized the man who robbed
him.21
A few days later, Detective Koch met with Hernandez and his
son again.22 It was at this meeting where Juan Jr. told Detective
Koch that based on neighborhood gossip, a man named Sebastian
was his father’s attacker, and Sebastian had been shot on Elmhurst
Avenue earlier in 2006.23 Detective Koch asked Juan Jr. if he knew
Sebastian, and he replied that he did not.24 Detective Koch located
the defendant’s photo based on Juan Jr.’s tip, and he assembled a
photo array.25 Again, with Juan Jr. acting as an interpreter, Detective
Koch showed the array to Hernandez.26 This time, Hernandez chose
the defendant’s photo out of the array.27 The defendant was arrested
and put in a line-up at the precinct.28 Now, with a Spanish-speaking
detective serving as an interpreter, Hernandez identified the defendant as his attacker.29
After the defendant was indicted, his defense counsel moved
to have the identification evidence suppressed because of the possibility that Juan Jr. knew the defendant prior to the identification pro16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

Id.
Id. at 385.
Id.
Delamota, 960 N.E.2d at 385.
Id.
Id. at 386.
Id. at 385.
Id.
Delamota, 960 N.E.2d at 385.
Id. at 386.
Id.
Id. at 386.
Id.
Delamota, 960 N.E.2d at 386.
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cedure while he served as the interpreter.30 The New York Supreme
Court denied the motion, holding that because Juan Jr. admitted to
Detective Koch that he did not know the defendant, the photo array
and subsequent line-up were not suggestive.31 However, the court
did note that the use of Juan Jr. as an interpreter was “not the best
practice.”32
At trial, Juan Jr. admitted that he knew the defendant for “[a]
long time” prior to the photo array.33 Defense counsel moved to reopen the Wade hearing34 but the court denied the motion, ruling that
the suppression court would have reached the same conclusion if it
knew that Juan Jr. was familiar with the defendant before the pretrial
identification.35 At the conclusion of the People’s case, the defense
counsel once again moved to dismiss the charges, this time based on
insufficient evidence and “numerous discrepancies in the [victim’s]
testimony.”36 The court denied the motion and the defendant was
convicted of “first-degree robbery, third-degree weapon possession,
and second-degree menacing.”37
On appeal, the defendant claimed that the trial court abused
its discretion when it refused to reopen the Wade hearing.38 The defendant also argued that the evidence was insufficient to prove guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt when there were discrepancies between

30

Id.
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)
34
See, e.g. 32A N.Y. Jur. 2d Criminal Law: Procedure § 1624 (“A Wade hearing is a particular type of suppression hearing, the purpose of which is to test identification testimony
for taint arising from official suggestion during police-arranged confrontations between a
defendant and an eyewitness. When the People serve statutory notice on a defendant that
they intend to introduce out-of-court identification testimony at trial, the defendant may
choose to respond with a motion to suppress that testimony and, so long as the motion alleges undue suggestiveness, the defendant is generally entitled to a Wade hearing.”).
35
Delamota, 960 N.E.2d at 386.
36
Id. Hernandez first described his attacker “as a Hispanic man in his mid-20[’s] who
weighed approximately 140 pounds and was about the detective’s height—five feet, six
inches. Hernandez also allegedly stated that the perpetrator held the knife in his right hand
and took the stolen items with his left hand.” Id. at 385. Delamota turned out to be significantly taller and did not have the ability to use both arms because of a gunshot injury. Id.
37
Id. at 386.
38
Delamota, 960 N.E.2d at 386.
31
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the sole witness’ pretrial statements and his testimony in court.39
However, the Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, holding
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and the conviction was
not against the weight of the evidence.40 The defendant was granted
leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals, and he raised the same issues
as in his first appeal.41
The court first addressed the defendant’s claim relating to inconsistencies between the victim’s first statement to the police and
his testimony at trial.42 The court dismissed this claim because the
standard of review applicable to this particular claim did not warrant
a reversal of the conclusion reached by the Appellate Division.43
The court then proceeded to address the defendant’s second
claim regarding the issue of whether the pretrial identification by
photo array was unduly suggestive when the detective was aware of
the possibility that the civilian interpreter knew the defendant prior to
the identification procedure.44 Ultimately, the Court of Appeals
found the identification procedure to be suggestive because the civilian interpreter could have influenced the victim’s identification of the
defendant.45 The People argued that the pretrial identification evidence should not be suppressed because Juan Jr., a civilian interpreter, was solely responsible for the suggestive aspect of the procedure.46 The court rejected this argument when it ruled that the
suggestiveness of this procedure is attributed to law enforcement because the detective chose to use Juan Jr. as an interpreter even though
the detective was aware of the risk that Juan Jr. knew the defendant.47
The court ordered a new trial to be preceded by an independent
source hearing.48 If the People could show by clear and convincing

39

Id. at 387.
Id. at 386-87.
41
Id. at 387.
42
Id.
43
Delamota, 960 N.E.2d at 390.
44
Id.
45
Id. at 390-91.
46
Id. at 390. See also People v. Marte, 912 N.E.2d 37, 38 (N.Y. 2009) (holding that suggestiveness attributed solely to a civilian does not violate a defendant’s due process rights
under the New York and Federal Constitutions).
47
Delamota, 960 N.E.2d at 391.
48
Id.
40
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evidence that the victim had a basis for his in-court identification independent of the suggestive pretrial identification, then the original
conviction would be valid.49
III.

THE FEDERAL APPROACH

The issue of pretrial identifications was first addressed by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Wade.50 Wade involved a defendant who was subjected to a post-indictment line-up without the assistance of counsel.51 The Court held that pretrial identifications require
the assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment in order to be
admissible at trial.52 The Court established this rule because it recognized the great potential for undue influence and “prejudice” that may
occur during a pretrial identification.53 The Court acknowledged that
the only way to remedy any “prejudice” is to require the presence of
counsel because counsel might prevent any unfair identification practices from occurring.54 The Court also established the rule that an incourt identification following a pretrial identification made without
the presence of counsel will only be admissible if the prosecution can
establish by clear and convincing evidence that the witness had an
independent source for his identification.55 The Court held that the
factors used to decide the issue of independent source includes the
opportunity to observe the crime, the accuracy of the description given by the witness, and the length of time between the crime and the
identification.56
The Supreme Court first held that an unduly suggestive pretrial identification procedure may deny the defendant due process of
49
Id. See also Young, 859 N.E.2d at 625 (holding that the witness had a basis independent from the suggestive pretrial identification procedure when the witness testified that although the perpetrator wore a mask during the crime, she retained a mental image of the defendant’s eyes).
50
388 U.S. 218 (1967).
51
Id. at 220.
52
Id. at 236-37. But see United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 321 (1973) (holding that the
right to counsel does not extend to pretrial photo identifications because the defendant is not
present during the identification).
53
Wade, 388 U.S. at 236.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 240.
56
Id. at 241.
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law in Stovall v. Denno.57 In Stovall, the defendant was accused of
stabbing a doctor to death, as well as the stabbing of the doctor’s
wife, Mrs. Behrendt, though she survived to be a witness.58 The police arrested the defendant, and they conducted a show-up identification in Mrs. Behrendt’s hospital room while the defendant was handcuffed to an officer.59 The defendant did not have an attorney at this
point.60 The defendant was identified by Mrs. Behrendt after officers
asked her if this “was the man.”61 Mrs. Behrendt also made an incourt identification of the defendant later at trial.62 The defendant
was convicted and sentenced to death.63
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and
the defendant sought habeas corpus relief in the District Court for the
Southern District of New York.64 He argued that his Fifth, Sixth, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated because he was brought
to the hospital room identification without counsel present and the attention of the witness was unfairly focused on him when he was the
only person in the room handcuffed to an officer.65 The District
Court dismissed the petition and, on appeal, the Second Circuit upheld the dismissal.66
The Supreme Court refused to apply the holding in Wade retroactively to the case, but it did contend the defendant’s argument
that the pretrial identification procedure was “so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification that he
was denied due process of law.”67 The Court held that the proper test
to be applied to the issue of whether admission of pretrial identification evidence violates a defendant’s due process rights is a totality of
the circumstances approach.68 The Court held that in this case the ex57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68

388 U.S. 293 (1967).
Id. at 295.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Stovall, 388 U.S. at 295.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 296.
Id.
Stovall, 388 U.S. at 302.
Id.
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igent circumstances dictated that the hospital room identification was
the only method of obtaining a proper identification.69 Mrs. Behrendt
was the only witness, and she was badly injured.70 There was no certainty as to if or when she would recover to make a proper identification in line-up at the police station.71 Thus, the defendant’s due process rights were not violated because, under the totality of the
circumstances, the hospital room identification procedure was warranted because of the exigent circumstances which surrounded this
particular identification.72
The Court specifically addressed the issue of unduly suggestive photo arrays in Simmons v. United States.73 The Court held that
convictions based on witness “identification[s] at trial following pretrial identification by photograph will be set aside on that ground only if the photographic identification procedure was so impermissibly
suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.”74 The Court also held that these types of
claims are judged by the totality of the circumstances and on the facts
of each particular case.75
Simmons involved a photographic identification of three men
who were arrested as suspects for a bank robbery.76 The robbery was
committed in broad daylight by two men, and neither of the robbers
wore masks.77 The FBI obtained several photographs which portrayed all three defendants.78 The photos were shown to five bank
employees who witnessed the robbery.79 All five employees identified Simmons as one of the robbers.80 About a week later, three of
the employees identified another defendant, Garrett, as the second
robber while the other two employees stated they did not have a clear
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80

Id.
Id.
Id.
Stovall, 388 U.S. at 302.
390 U.S. 377 (1968).
Id. at 384.
Id. at 383.
Id. at 380.
Id. at 385.
Simmons, 390 U.S. at 385.
Id.
Id. at 380.
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view of the second robber.81
At trial, all five witnesses identified Simmons as one of the
robbers, and three identified Garrett as the other robber.82 All three
defendants were convicted.83 On appeal, the defendant that was not
identified by any of the witnesses had his conviction reversed, while
the convictions of Simmons and Garrett were affirmed.84 Certiorari
was granted as to Simmons and Garrett.85 Simmons argued that his
pretrial photograph identification “was so unduly prejudicial as fatally to taint his conviction.”86 Garrett argued his constitutional rights
were violated for an unrelated reason, and his conviction was reversed.87
The Court reasoned that the pretrial photographic identification was not unnecessarily suggestive because there was little chance
that the procedure led to the misidentification of Simmons under the
totality of the circumstances.88 The Court held that the witnesses
were able to make a positive identification of Simmons because the
robbery occurred in broad daylight and the robbers wore no masks so
the witnesses viewed the robbers’ faces for an extended period of
time.89 The Court also held that nothing about the procedure could
have led to the misidentification of Simmons as one of the robbers
because the FBI displayed photos containing Simmons among several
other people, each witness viewed the photos alone, and there was no
evidence to demonstrate that the FBI said anything to the witnesses to
suggest the photos contained suspects in the robbery.90 The Court
went on to explain that all five witnesses positively identified Simmons in the photos, and the identifications were confirmed at trial by
all the witnesses who did not display any doubts that Simmons was

81

Id. at 380-81.
Id. at 381.
83
Simmons, 390 U.S. at 381.
84
Id.
85
Id. at 381.
86
Id. at 383.
87
Id. at 390-91. The Court reversed Garret’s conviction because his Fourth Amendment
rights were violated when the trial court allowed Garret’s testimony from a pretrial motion to
suppress the suitcase and contents to prove his guilt. Simmons, 390 U.S. at 390-91.
88
Id. at 385.
89
Id. at 385.
90
Id.
82
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the robber.91 The Court affirmed Simmons’ conviction because there
was no cause to doubt that the identification of Simmons was correct
under the totality of the circumstances.92
The Court applied the totality test for in-court identifications
from Stovall to consider the reliability of evidence derived from suggestive pretrial procedures in Neil v. Biggers.93 In Neil, the Supreme
Court outlined specific factors to determine the issue of whether a
pretrial identification that may have been unduly suggestive could be
admitted as evidence at trial.94 Neil involved an abduction and rape
of a woman.95 The woman was attacked in her kitchen at knifepoint,
and then she was taken to a desolate location near her home and
raped.96 The victim claimed that she was able to see the perpetrator
inside her home even though the lights were off in the kitchen because of the light shining through from the bedroom.97 She also stated that she got a good look at him during the rape because it was a
full moon, and the entire ordeal lasted half an hour.98 The victim
provided a thorough description of the perpetrator including his age,
height, weight, build, facial complexion, and voice.99 The police
showed the victim thirty to forty pictures over a seven-month period,
but she never identified her attacker.100
Police eventually arrested the defendant for a subsequent attack, and they brought in the former victim to potentially identify him
as her attacker.101 The police attempted to perform a line-up, but they
were unable to find people resembling the defendant.102 Instead, they
performed a show-up where the victim walked by the defendant, and
the police had the defendant say the words used during the attack.103

91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103

Id.
Simmons, 390 U.S. at 385.
409 U.S. 188 (1972).
Id. at 199-200.
Id. at 193.
Id. at 193-94.
Id. at 194.
Neil, 409 U.S. at 194.
Id.
Id. at 194-95.
Id. at 195.
Id.
Neil, 409 U.S. at 195.
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The victim in the present case identified the defendant as her attacker,
and she later testified that she could never have forgotten his face.104
At trial the defendant was convicted of rape, and he sought
habeas corpus relief.105 The district court held that the show-up was
unduly suggestive in violation of the defendant’s due process rights,
and the court reversed the guilty verdict.106 The district court relied
on the fact that police did not make a better effort to perform a lineup, and the show-up itself was unduly suggestive requiring a reversal
of the verdict.107
The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower court’s decision,
holding that even though the show-up was unduly suggestive, the
identification was reliable under the totality of the circumstances.108
The Court explained that a show-up is not in itself a violation of due
process, demonstrated by the hospital room show-up in Stovall.109
The Court held that admission of the pretrial identification turns on
several factors to determine whether it is reliable:110
[T]he factors to be considered in evaluating the likelihood of misidentification include the opportunity of
the witness to view the criminal at the time of the
crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of
the witness’ prior description of the criminal, the level
of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime
and the confrontation.111
The Court held that in applying these factors to the case at
hand, the pretrial identification was reliable and admissible:112 the
victim viewed the defendant for a half hour under adequate lighting
in her home and outside under the light of a full moon;113 the victim’s
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113

Id.
Id. at 196.
Id. at 200.
Id.
Neil, 409 U.S. at 200.
Id. at 200-01.
Id. at 199-200.
Id.
Id. at 200.
Neil, 409 U.S. at 200-01.
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attention was only on the defendant as this was an intimate and serious crime;114 and the victim provided an accurate description of her
attacker after the crime, and the victim testified that there was no
doubt as to the identity of her attacker.115 The Court dismissed the
seven-month period between the crime and identification because the
victim was shown at least thirty photos of potential attackers, but she
never identified anybody before she identified the defendant.116 The
Court held that the victim’s identification contained no substantial
likelihood of misidentification, and the evidence was properly allowed to go to the jury.117
In Manson v. Brathwaite,118 the Supreme Court applied the
factors used in Neil to pretrial photographic identifications as well.119
Brathwaite involved an undercover narcotics sting in which an officer purchased heroin from a seller in a well-lit hallway outside the
seller’s apartment.120 The undercover officer described the seller to
another officer moments later as a “colored man, approximately five
feet eleven inches tall, dark complexion, black hair, short Afro style,
and having high cheekbones, and of a heavy build.”121 The other officer believed he knew the seller as the defendant in this case, and he
left a picture of the defendant on the desk of the undercover officer.122 The undercover officer confirmed that the defendant was the
seller, and the defendant was later arrested and convicted of possession and sale of heroin.123
The undercover officer testified at trial that there was no
doubt that the picture was of the defendant, and he made a positive
in-court identification of the defendant as the seller.124 The defendant
sought habeas corpus relief, but the district court dismissed the peti-

114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 200-01.
432 U.S. 98 (1977).
Id. at 114.
Id. at 99-100.
Id. at 101.
Id.
Manson, 432 U.S. at 101-02.
Id. at 102.
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tion.125 The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the pretrial identification by photo should have been excluded from evidence because
the use of a single photo is unduly suggestive regardless of reliability.126
The Court reversed the lower courts’ decisions because, under
the totality of the circumstances, the officer’s positive identification
of the photo of the defendant as the seller was reliable and therefore
admissible regardless of suggestiveness.127 The Court specifically rejected the per se approach utilized by the lower court that would exclude an unduly suggestive pretrial identification without regard to
reliability.128 The Court held that the factors set forth in Neil also apply to pretrial identifications by photograph.129 The Court explained
that the use of a single photograph was unduly suggestive, but upon
application of the factors comprising the totality of the circumstances,
the officer’s identification of the defendant did not possess a “substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.”130 The Court
held the identification by a single photo to be reliable because: the
witness was a trained police officer; he had sufficient opportunity to
view the seller in a well-lit hallway; he accurately described the seller; he positively identified the defendant’s photo as the seller two
days after the crime; and he positively identified the defendant in
court with confidence upon cross-examination.131 The Court made it
clear in this holding that a reliable identification trumps an unduly
suggestive pretrial identification procedure utilizing a single photo.132
After expressly applying the totality of the circumstances test
to pretrial photo identifications, the Court finally addressed suggestive practices attributed solely to civilians. In Perry v. New Hampshire,133 the Court addressed the issue of whether an inquiry into the
reliability of a witness’ pretrial identification is required when the al-

125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133

Id. at 103.
Id. at 103-04.
Id. at 117.
Manson, 432 U.S. at 113.
Id. at 114.
Id. at 116.
Id. at 114-16.
Id. at 111-13.
132 S. Ct. 716 (2012).
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legedly suggestive procedure is not arranged by law enforcement.134
Previous Circuit Court of Appeals cases held that an inquiry into the
reliability is required even when the suggestive circumstances are arranged by civilians.135 In Perry, the Court expressly abrogated these
previous Circuit Court of Appeals cases when the Court held that the
Due Process Clause does not require an inquiry into the reliability of
the pretrial identification when the suggestive circumstances were
created by civilians.136
In Perry, New Hampshire police were called because Nubia
Blandon saw a man attempting to break into various cars on her
block.137 When the police were interviewing Blandon, the officer
asked her to describe the man she saw.138 In response, Blandon
pointed out her window and said the man she saw breaking into cars
was standing in the parking lot next to another police officer.139 The
defendant was arrested following this identification.140 At trial, the
defendant moved to suppress the identification on the grounds that it
was unduly suggestive.141 The court denied the motion because it
found that the police did not create the allegedly suggestive circumstances.142 The defendant was convicted, and he appealed all the way
up to the Supreme Court.143
The defendant argued that reliability is paramount to the admissibility of a suggestive pretrial identification procedure, and it
does not matter whether the police or a civilian created the suggestive
circumstances.144 The Court expressly rejected this argument because the due process check for reliability is designed to deter improper police identification procedures.145 The Court held that the of134

Id. at 720-21.
See, e.g., Bouthot v. U.S., 878 F.2d 1506 (1st Cir. 1989); Dunnigan v. Keane, 137 F.3d
117 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that suggestiveness attributed to civilians violates the defendant’s due process rights).
136
Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 730.
137
Id. at 721.
138
Id. at 722.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 722.
142
Id.
143
Id. at 722-23.
144
Id. at 725.
145
Id.
135
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ficer did nothing to create a suggestive circumstance, and there is no
requirement under the Due Process Clause to check for reliability
when the suggestive circumstance is not attributable to law enforcement.146
IV.

THE STATE APPROACH

Under the New York State Constitution, the New York Court
of Appeals interpreted the Due Process Clause to require a per se approach to the admissibility of pretrial identifications by photographic
array, which is in direct conflict with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. In
People v. Adams,147 the Court of Appeals held that any unduly suggestive pretrial identification procedure requires the exclusion of that
pretrial identification from evidence regardless of reliability.148
However, the court held that the impermissibly suggestive pretrial
identification procedure did not warrant reversal because there were
two other witnesses who were not present at the suggestive pretrial
identification, and the tainted witnesses had an independent basis for
their in court identification.149
Adams involved a robbery of a stationery store by three
150
men.
The men entered the store and announced a robbery to three
witnesses who worked in the store.151 The men took forty-two dollars
from the cash register and then proceeded to flee on foot while being
chased by two witnesses.152 A security guard and police officer witnessed the chase and joined in.153 The security guard apprehended
one man with the money and a gun while the other two men escaped.154 The man who was arrested provided information that led to
the arrest of the other two men, Gatson and Adams.155 That evening,
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155

Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 726.
423 N.E.2d 379, 383-84 (N.Y. 1981).
Id.
Id. at 384.
Id. at 380.
Id.
Adams, 423 N.E.2d at 380.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 381.
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the three witnesses were called to the station house to identify the
three suspects.156 The witnesses were told by an officer that they had
the suspects in custody.157 The three suspects were shown together to
the three witnesses at the same time.158 They were sure the three men
were the robbers.159
The man arrested at the scene pled guilty, and the other two
were later convicted at trial.160 At trial, defense moved to suppress
the pretrial identification and subsequent in-court identification on
the basis that the procedure was unduly suggestive when the officer
stated to the eyewitnesses that they had the suspects in custody.161
The court denied the motion because it found that even if the pretrial
identification was unduly suggestive, the witnesses had an independent basis for an in-court identification.162 The security guard and the
officer at the scene also identified Adams as one of the robbers at trial.163 The defendant appealed, but the Appellate Division affirmed
the conviction.164 Adams appealed to the Court of Appeals.165
The Court of Appeals held that the evidence of the pretrial
identification at the station house was unduly suggestive and should
not have been admitted at trial.166 This case established a per se rule
of exclusion of any identification evidence produced by a suggestive
pretrial identification procedure.167 The court reasoned that the pretrial identification at the station was unduly suggestive because an officer told the victims that they had the suspects in custody and all victims viewed all three robbers at the same time.168 However, the court
also held that in-court identifications are still admissible when there
is an independent source of the identification.169 The court held that
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169

Id.
Adams, 423 N.E.2d at 381.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Adams, 423 N.E.2d at 381.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 382-83.
Adams, 423 N.E.2d at 382-83.
Id. at 382.
Id. at 384.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol29/iss4/17

16

Gordon: Suggestive Pretrial Identification

2013]

SUGGESTIVE PRETRIAL IDENTIFICATION

1321

the exclusion of the pretrial identification would not require reversal
of the conviction because of the in-court identifications by the security guard and officer who were not present at the station house showup.170 The Court of Appeals was also persuaded by the trial court’s
express finding of an independent source of the in-court identifications by the three victims who viewed the robbers’ faces throughout
the robbery.171
After holding that pretrial identification evidence derived
from a suggestive procedure is per se inadmissible, the Court of Appeals outlined the procedure to address a defendant’s challenge that
an identification procedure was suggestive in People v. Chipp.172
When a pretrial identification procedure is challenged, the People
have the “initial burden of going forward to establish the reasonableness of the police conduct and the lack of any undue suggestiveness.”173 Once the People meet this burden, the defendant must go on
to prove that the identification procedure was unduly suggestive.174
A procedure is deemed suggestive if there is a “substantial likelihood
that the defendant would be singled out for identification.”175 If suggestiveness is shown, the evidence derived from the pretrial identification is inadmissible, and the People must go on to show by clear
and convincing evidence that the witness had an independent source
for the in-court identification.176
In Chipp, the defendant argued that he had satisfied his burden of demonstrating that the identification procedure was suggestive
because he was the only person in a line-up with a complexion similar to the one described by the witness.177 However, the court held
that the difference in skin tone of the men in the line-up does not sufficiently demonstrate that the procedure was unduly suggestive.178
Therefore, the defendant did not meet his burden of showing that the
identification procedure created a “substantial likelihood that the de170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178

Id.
Id.
552 N.E.2d 608 (N.Y. 1990).
Id. at 613.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Chipp, 552 N.E.2d at 613.
Id.
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fendant would be singled out for identification.”179
Once the court firmly established that evidence derived from
suggestive pretrial identification procedures arranged by law enforcement is per se inadmissible, the court addressed the issue of
when the suggestive aspect of the procedure is created by a civilian in
People v. Marte.180 In Marte, a minor referred to as Peter L. was
robbed and shot in the chest on the block where he lived.181 After
looking through hundreds of photos, Peter was unable to identify his
attacker.182 After giving up on identifying the shooter, Peter’s sister
Margaret found out that the defendant was the shooter when the defendant told Margaret that he had recently shot somebody on her
block.183 Margaret showed Peter a picture of the defendant, and after
encouragement from his sister, Peter went to the police and named
the defendant as his attacker.184 Peter proceeded to pick the defendant out from a line-up.185 The defendant was convicted, and on appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed.186
The court held that the rule of exclusion regarding suggestive
pretrial identifications does not apply when suggestiveness is created
by a civilian.187 The court found that the police were not aware of
Margaret’s involvement in the identification at the time.188 The court
reasoned that the rule excluding evidence derived from a suggestive
pretrial identification should not be extended to include suggestive
practices by civilians because the rule is in place to prevent mistaken
identifications caused by faulty police procedures.189 The court held
that the purpose of the rule is to affect police procedures, and the
family and friends of a victim are not likely to change their behavior
based on rules of law.190
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190

Id.
Marte, 912 N.E.2d 37.
Id. at 38.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Marte, 912 N.E.2d at 38.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 41.
Id. at 39.
Marte, 912 N.E.2d at 39.
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After the court held that suggestive practices attributed to civilians does not violate due process, the court in People v. McBride191
demonstrated the standard of review applicable in cases where there
is a challenge to the admissibility of pretrial identification. In
McBride, the victim described his attacker as a man wearing a grey
jacket among other articles of clothing.192 At the lineup, the defendant was wearing a grey jacket, but he was not wearing any of the other specific articles of clothing described by the victim. The victim
chose the defendant, and he was convicted.193 On appeal, the defendant argued that there was a substantial likelihood of misidentification
because he was the only person wearing a grey jacket.194
The court held that there was sufficient record support for the
lower court’s determination that the pretrial identification was not
unduly suggestive because the grey jacket was not unusual, and all
the other factors including race, height, and age were constant among
the individuals in the lineup.195 The mere coincidence that the defendant was wearing an article of clothing similar to the type described by the victim does not render the pretrial identification suggestive when that article of clothing is not distinctive in any way.196
The court in Delamota cited People v. Wilson197 in support of
its determination that the new trial be preceded by a hearing to allow
the People to show by clear and convincing evidence that there was
an independent basis for Hernandez’s in-court identification.198 Wilson also supports the proposition that the trial court should go
through the full analysis when a pretrial identification procedure is
challenged so the appellate courts have all the facts necessary to
make a proper determination.199
In Wilson, the trial court held that the pretrial identification
was not suggestive where the witness was shown a photo of the de-

191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199

928 N.E.2d 1027.
Id. at 1032.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1033.
McBride, 928 N.E.2d at 1033.
835 N.E.2d 1220 (N.Y. 2005).
Delamota, 960 N.E.2d at 391.
Wilson, 835 N.E.2d at 1221.
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fendant immediately preceding the lineup.200 However, the trial court
did not proceed to determine if there was an independent source for
the witness’ in-court identification.201 The Court of Appeals subsequently held that the pretrial identification was suggestive, and it ordered a new trial to be preceded by a hearing to determine if there
was an independent basis for the witness’ in-court identification.202
The court noted that the trial courts should always determine if there
is an independent source for the witness’ in-court identification, even
if they find that the pretrial identification procedure was not suggestive.203
After the court in Delamota addressed the need for lower
courts to address the independent source requirement even when it
did not find the procedure to be suggestive, the court also cited People v. Young204 to demonstrate the independent basis requirement for
the admissibility of an in-court identification.205 In Young, the trial
court found the pretrial identification to be unduly suggestive and inadmissible.206 The trial court subsequently held that the victim had
an independent basis for the in-court identification because the victim
testified that although the defendant’s face was covered with a mask,
she retained a mental image of the defendant’s eyes from the crime
that lasted approximately five to seven minutes.207 On appeal, the
Court of Appeals refused to disturb this finding of fact. 208 The finding was held to meet the clear and convincing requirement to show
that there was an independent basis for an in-court identification.209

200

Id.
Id.
202
Id.
203
Id.
204
859 N.E.2d 623 (N.Y. 2006).
205
Delamota, 960 N.E.2d at 391.
206
Young, 859 N.E.2d at 625.
207
Id. at 624-25.
208
Id. at 625.
209
Id. See also People v. Hall, 870 N.Y.S.2d 508, 511 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2008) (holding that the witness had an independent source for the identification because the witness had
a face-to-face conversation with the defendant for several minutes, and the witness gave an
accurate description of the defendant shortly after the crime occurred).
201
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DOES THE NEW YORK APPROACH RESULT IN MORE
RELIABLE CONVICTIONS?

The majority in People v. Adams established the per se rule of
exclusion of identification evidence derived from suggestive pretrial
identification procedures.210 The very same rule was contemplated
by the Court in Manson v. Brathwaite, but was rejected in favor of a
less rigid totality of the circumstances approach.211 In Manson, the
Court found the per se approach to prevent reliable and relevant identification evidence from reaching the jury while serving the same deterrent effect as the totality rule.212 The majority in Adams expressly
rejected the Court’s reasoning in Brathwaite because it felt that the
admission of pretrial identifications derived from suggestive procedures would increase the number of wrongful convictions.213 The
concurrence in Adams disagreed with the majority’s adoption of the
per se rule of exclusion, stating the rule “lacks legal, logical[,] and
analytical validity.”214
On its face, a per se rule of exclusion reduces the risk of
wrongful convictions. The strongest argument in favor of a per se
rule is the deterrent effect. An absolute rule excluding identification
evidence derived from suggestive procedures ensures that law enforcement will take the necessary precautions to conduct pretrial
identifications in a proper manner.215 As with other exclusionary
rules, the main purpose is to affect the procedures and practices of
210

Adams, 423 N.E.2d at 383-84.
Manson, 432 U.S. 111-13. The Court laid out three factors that a proper rule should
address. Those factors are the problem of unreliable eyewitness identification, the deterrent
effect, and the proper administration of justice. Id. The Court held that the per se approach
is too extreme a solution to protect these interests. Id.
212
Id.
213
Adams, 423 N.E.2d at 384 (“However, if the jury finds the in-court identification not
entirely convincing it should not be permitted to resolve its doubts by relying on the fact that
the witness had identified the defendant on a prior occasion if that identification was made
under inherently suggestive circumstances. Similarly, if the witness is unable to identify the
defendant at trial the defendant’s conviction should not rest solely upon evidence of a pretrial identification made under circumstances which were likely to produce an unreliable result.”).
214
Id. (Cooke, J., concurring) (arguing that the totality rule adopted by the Court in Manson sufficiently addresses the due process concerns inherent with suggestive pretrial identification procedures).
215
Manson, 432 U.S. at 125 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
211
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law enforcement.216 A totality approach in this circumstance does not
give law enforcement the necessary encouragement to alter their procedures because of the extreme flexibility of the rule.217 Under the
totality approach, even the most suggestive procedures may result in
admission of the pretrial identification evidence.218 Deterrence is a
key aspect in prevention of wrongful convictions.219
However, the per se rule of exclusion adopted by the New
York Court of Appeals does not serve the purpose of limiting wrongful convictions when in-court identifications are permissible under
the lenient independent source rule.220 Under the federal approach, as
laid down in Simmons, an in-court identification following a suggestive pretrial procedure is subjected to a more rigorous standard to determine whether the suggestive procedure produced “a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.”221
The risk of a wrongful conviction in a case where the pretrial
identification was gained under a suggestive procedure is increased
under the New York independent source rule.222 In Delamota, the
court held that the validity of the conviction rested on whether the
People could show that there was an independent source for the witness’ in-court identification.223 The standard for evaluating whether a
witness has a source independent of the suggestive procedure to identify the defendant in court has deteriorated in New York. The standard used in Delamota, the clear and convincing evidence requirement
demonstrated by Young, is very lenient because the witness was only
able to see the criminal’s eyes for five to seven minutes.224 This
standard falls short of the standard pronounced in Simmons.225
216

Id.
Id.
218
Id.
219
Adams, 423 N.E.2d at 383.
220
See Young, 859 N.E.2d at 624-25 (holding that a mental image of the defendant’s eyes
will satisfy the independent source requirement).
221
Simmons, 390 U.S. at 384. See also Neil, 409 U.S. at 199-200 (applying the same
standard for determining whether in-court identifications are reliable to determine whether
pretrial identifications are admissible).
222
See Young, 859 N.E.2d at 624-25 (holding that a mental image of the defendant’s eyes
will satisfy the independent source requirement).
223
Delamota, 960 N.E.2d at 391.
224
Young, 859 N.E.2d at 624-25.
225
Simmons, 390 U.S. at 385.
217
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As in Young, the victim in Delamota may easily provide an
independent basis for his in-court identification because he claimed
to have recognized his attacker before the suggestive procedure occurred. The People may argue that the victim had an independent basis for his in-court identification because the victim told a therapist
that he had previously seen his attacker in the apartment complex.226
This conversation with the therapist occurred before the suggestive
identification procedure occurred.227 The court may find this conversation to be clear and convincing evidence of an independent source
when judged against the standard from Young.
Under the federal approach, the standard for evaluating
whether an in-court identification following a suggestive pretrial procedure is from an independent source has been interpreted to be identical to the standard for determining whether identification evidence
derived from suggestive pretrial procedures is admissible.228 The factors considered by the Court in Neil to determine the admissibility of
suggestive pretrial identification evidence guides our analysis of
whether an in-court identification is permissible following a suggestive pretrial procedure.229 In applying these factors to Delamota, it
can be determined whether the federal approach affords more protection from wrongful convictions.
The first factor the Court considers in the evaluation of incourt identifications following a suggestive pretrial procedure is the
opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime.230 In
Delamota, the People might argue that the victim had sufficient opportunity to view the criminal because Hernandez was face to face
with the defendant during the robbery that occurred in an elevator.231
Furthermore, Hernandez told his therapist that he recognized the man
who robbed him from a previous encounter in his apartment complex.232 The defendant might argue that Hernandez did not have sufficient opportunity to view the criminal at the time because the rob-

226
227
228
229
230
231
232

Delamota, 960 N.E.2d at 386.
Id.
Manson, 432 U.S. at 123-24 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 114.
Delamota, 960 N.E.2d at 385.
Id. at 386.
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bery could not have lasted more than a couple minutes.233
The second factor considered by the Court is the witness’ degree of attention at the time of the crime.234 The People might next
argue that Hernandez exhibited a great deal of attention because the
robbery occurred in such a small space.235 It may be further argued
that Hernandez was the target of the attack, and as the victim, he had
a personal stake in observing the man who perpetrated the crime.236
The defendant might counter that Hernandez did not exhibit the appropriate degree of attention because victims often do not concentrate
on the face of his or her attacker.
The next factor considered by the Court is the accuracy of the
description given by the witness.237 The People’s argument is weak
because Hernandez’s first description of his attacker was very inaccurate.238 His description was only accurate in that he labeled his attacker as a Hispanic male, but the age and height were inaccurate.239
The defendant might argue that Hernandez’s initial description was
inaccurate because Hernandez stated that his attacker used both arms
during the robbery while this was impossible for the defendant due to
a bullet wound.240 The People might then argue that Hernandez never
said that the robber used both of his arms, and the detective’s recollection of Hernandez’s description was inaccurate when he testified
at trial.241
The fourth factor is the witness’ degree of certainty when testifying at trial.242 The People might argue that Hernandez was certain
about the identity of his attacker at trial when he gave various explanations for the discrepancies in his description to rebut the assertion
that he was mistaken about the identity of his attacker.243 The defendant might then argue that Hernandez could not have been certain
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243

Id. at 385.
Manson, 432 U.S. at 115.
Delamota, 960 N.E.2d at 385.
Id.
Manson, 432 U.S. at 115.
Delamota, 960 N.E.2d at 385.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Manson, 432 U.S. at 115.
Delamota, 960 N.E.2d at 386.
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about the identity of his attacker because of the various discrepancies
in the description of his attacker.244 Hernandez’s explanations should
not amount to certainty after the defendant was already deemed guilty
by the civilian interpreter.245
The final factor considered by the Court under the totality approach is the time between the confrontation and the crime.246 The
People might likely argue that no significant amount of time passed
between the crime and confrontation because it only occurred a few
days after the robbery.247 The defendant does not have a valid argument considering that a few days cannot be considered a significant
amount of time.
Under the totality of the circumstances, the Court may find
that the discrepancies between Hernandez’s initial description and the
defendant render his in-court identification unreliable when judged
against the corrupting effect of the procedure utilized. The procedure
in this case was very corruptive because the civilian interpreter used
by law enforcement may have influenced the victim’s identification
when the interpreter thought the defendant was responsible before the
identification occurred. The fact that Hernandez told his therapist
that he recognized the man who attacked him has no weight because
Hernandez’s initial description was completely inaccurate. If he recognized his attacker, then his description should have been more accurate.
Based on the above analysis, with the limited facts available
to the court in Delamota, the federal independent source rule seems
to be more protective against wrongful convictions. The federal totality test used to determine whether an in-court identification following a suggestive pretrial identification procedure uses all available
facts to determine the issue in a concrete fashion. The standard used
in New York seems to have deteriorated over time based on the decision in Young. The New York independent source standard requires
careful consideration by the courts to determine if this is the best rule
for guarding against wrongful convictions.

244
245
246
247

Id. at 385.
Id.
Manson, 432 U.S. at 115-16.
Delamota, 960 N.E.2d at 385.
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CONCLUSION

The two approaches laid out in this Note are only applicable
to suggestiveness resulting from identification procedures employed
by law enforcement.248 This was a central issue in Delamota.249 The
court could have decided this issue either way because the extent of
Juan Jr.’s familiarity with the defendant was unknown by anyone, including the detective, until Juan Jr.’s testimony at trial.250 However,
the detective should not have trusted a civilian with the important
task of interpreting an interview with a police officer.251 The court
made an example of the detective by condemning this practice when
it held that the procedure was unduly suggestive.252 The court made
the right choice because this decision will inform law enforcement of
the importance associated with proper pretrial identification procedures and convictions at trial.
Under the Federal and New York approaches, the concern regarding suggestive pretrial identifications is focused on the general
reliability of the witness’ identification. The procedures employed by
the police are the secondary concern because both approaches allow
for an identification in some form or another regardless of the suggestiveness of the procedure employed by law enforcement.253 This
is a major concern for the due process rights of defendants because
law enforcement can employ a wide range of suggestive procedures
248
Compare Marte, 912 N.E.2d at 39 (holding that suggestiveness attributed solely to a
civilian does not violate a defendant’s due process rights under the New York State Constitution), with Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 730 (holding that suggestiveness created by civilians does not
require a reliability analysis).
249
Delamota, 960 N.E.2d at 391.
250
Id. at 386.
251
Id. at 391 (holding that there was no record support for the lower court’s finding that
the photo array was not unduly suggestive because the lower court knew that Juan Jr. was
familiar with the defendant, Detective Koch had reason to believe that Juan Jr. was familiar
with the defendant, the Detective acted on unspecified neighborhood gossip, there was no
reason for the Detective to use Juan Jr. as an interpreter instead of an impartial translator,
and the Detective could not be reasonably sure that Juan Jr. would accurately translate the
conversation).
252
Id.
253
Compare Chipp, 552 N.E.2d at 613 (holding that an in-court identification may be
made when there is a basis for the witness’ identification independent of the suggestive procedure), with Manson, 432 U.S. at 117 (holding that under the totality of the circumstances
the officer’s positive identification of the photo of the defendant as the seller was reliable
and therefore admissible regardless of suggestiveness).
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that may result in misidentifications. A witness’ memory is a fragile
resource that may seem reliable even when it is generally accepted
that witness testimony is almost always suspect. Convictions based
on witness identifications and testimony should be closely regulated
by the courts, and further protection should be afforded to defendants
in the form of stricter rules of suppression when pretrial identifications procedures are deemed unduly suggestive.

Matthew Gordon*

*

J.D. Candidate 2014, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center; B.A. 2011, Stony
Brook University. I would like to thank the Editors and Staff of the Touro Law Review for
guiding me through the publication process. And most importantly, I would like to thank
Kerrie and my family because without them, I would not be where I am today.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2013

27

